Time for Powersharing - Part 1
The 18-18 ethnic gridlock of December 10, 2002 has produced a situation in which the Afro PNM's Patrick Manning has been appointed prime minister, the Indo UNC's Basdeo Panday is refusing to accept appointment as leader of the opposition, there is no agreement on who should be speaker in the lower house, that house cannot be convened, Manning is bent on governing regardless, and Panday is bent both on shutting down the government and on having fresh elections immediately held.
At the heart of the situation is ethnic distrust of ethnic monopoly of the spoils of office in a continuing tradition of governance despite an election result that plainly shows an electorate desire for powersharing.
The reflex of a ruling party taking all the spoils is being met this time around by a refusal of the party out of power to let the monopoly succeed. And though Panday's refusal of the office of opposition leader and his call for fresh elections are patently opportunistic, self-serving, and unlikely to end the gridlock, they are nonetheless, in context, the first true signs of the kind of politics needed for constitutional reform. Along with, of course, Manning's insistence in running a government in the traditional first-past-the-post way and for the statutory five years.
This country desperately needs constitutional reform and real politics, and if Panday's antics can help to usher them in, no matter how morally despicable those antics might seem to some, then so let it be. A constitutional reform in which ethnic diversity is catered to on the principles of equality/equitability and transparency in powersharing should not be subordinated to any stipulation or belief that politicians should first adhere to whatever standards of morality; it is for the politics to take care of immorality. We need to have a system of governance that enables ethnicities to participate meaningfully in the executive decision-making process, but that at the same time allows a politics that will impose checks and balances on the behaviour of politicians and that, in particular, makes it difficult for them to sanitise improper behaviour through ethnic narcissism.
Ethnic powersharing would bring about a fairer balance of power, achieve the confidence of far more citizens in both the government and the political process, strengthen voter confidence, usher in a culture of ethnic negotiation, and alienate ethnic violence as a solution to ethnic dissatisfactions.
No one person or nation knows what system of powersharing would be best for Trinidad and Tobago. There is a wide range of powersharing arrangements in today's world, and each arrangement is informed by the particular conditions of local contexts. Trinidad and Tobago must come up with its own arrangement, but it would take the fullest possible consultation by all the significant groups in the society.
Among the options that are currently available are the following: 1) proportional representation on the basis of elections, through which, critically, minority parties or numerically weaker parties are guaranteed a voice in the decision-making process; 2) proportionality (in accordance with group numbers) in public service recruitment, as well as in the allocation of state positions and resources; 3) consociationalism, i.e., the sharing of executive power among all significant groups without prejudice to acceptable levels of group autonomy, group re-formation, and coalition-building; 4) corporate federalism, a kind of integrative, non-territorial arrangement in which political moderation and accommodation of minority influence are critical and politicians could depend on the support of members of groups other than their own; and 5) territorial federalism, in which two (e.g., geographical) territories have equitable status in a federal government.
The significant groups in the country have (to be mobilised) to come together to discuss and forge an arrangement. But the problem is how. We don't have the politics yet to bring ourselves together for conversations on this kind of matter. We have a history of waiting for the government to take the initiative on matters of legislation. Divided as we are along ethnic lines, and bereft of a culture of routinely focused conscientious objection, we do not know how to force a government to act in our best corporate interests. We don't know how to shut the country down and parley for a fresh start.
And we have three ethnic leaders who are not taking the right initiative. Manning thinks that he should stay in power and rule from a monopolistic position. Panday thinks fresh general elections will do the trick. And Orville London is opportunistically subordinating his voice to that of his boss in Trinidad.
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3
Archives / Winford James Homepage / Previous Page
^^ Back to top
